1999 might be leading the world into a new millennium, but anything historically significant is yet to occur this year. Thus it stands in contrast to the situation ten years ago, when 1989 brought changes that united the world and ended the cold war. People stormed the Berlin wall, tore it down and visited family members on the other side for the first time in fifty years. Yet, a few strongholds of Communism remain. China stands out as the most significant of these, where a population of more than a billion live in a society still heavily influenced by Marxist doctrines. Vietnam, Cuba and North-Korea are other countries that very likely will enter the new millennium with Communist regimes in control, but this paper will in addition to China only focus on North-Korea. The paper will show how we after the fall of the Soviet Union are only left with some very modified forms of Communism, and that the politically theory of Marxism only is a part of the inspiration behind the regimes. It should in the end be clear that even though the name Communism is still alive and kicking, the ideas behind it seem to be dead or on life support.

Before commencing on the main argument, a short explanation on why the cases of China and North Korea have been selected has to be given. This will be proceeded by an estimation of the actual influence Communism enjoys in the two nations. A central question to ask is why some nations decided not to abandon Communism in 1989/1990; this by refusing to follow what must be considered a global trend of perestroika and democratization at the time. Finally I will attempt to predict, if possible, the future of Communism in North-Korea and China, that is if anything of that kind can be said to exist in the two countries at the moment.

As will later become apparent throughout my paper, many of the key factors behind the survival of Communism do to a varying degree have their basis in the particular historic incidents in each country. An awareness of this fact is for instance essential if the origin of Communism in China and North-Korea is to be understood, and additionally how the political doctrines of Communism can survive in some countries while having already been proclaimed dead in so many others. To limit the scope of this paper though, Cuba, Vietnam and other various African countries that could be considered Communist have been omitted. The former Caribbean nation is evidently not included because of the very different geographic, political, economic and historic background that would have to be taken into account. Fidel Castro's Communist coup in 1959 does for example demand comprehensive knowledge on an entirely new region, and this paper does therefore not perspire to explain the survival of Communism as a political system in a global perspective. This is not to say that the close relationships between the former Communist countries should be underestimated. Che Guevera did for instance himself proclaim North Korea as a model to which revolutionary Cuba should aspire, this after a visit to Pyongyang in 1965. In addition to faraway Cuba though, Vietnam is also omitted, but for very different reasons. The origins of Communism in the former Indochina are very similar to that of China, this as the former throughout history often has acted as a vassal state for the latter. Vietnamese who in crossed over into China after the revolution of 1911 actually formed many of the first underground Communist organisations that sprang up in Vietnam. Even though Soviet and European socialism later would influence Ho Chi Minh and the rise of Vietnamese Communism to at least the same degree as Chinese Communism did, these differences in political theory do not constitute a sufficient foundation from which to focus on yet another case.

Finally I must emphasise that my use of the term Communism will have its basis in the generally understood meaning of the word. Many self-proclaimed Communists do indeed argue that there never has existed a real Communist society, this due to the presence of corrupt social influences or the similar. The estimation that follows of China and North-Korea might indeed support this claim to a certain degree, but it must at the same time be acknowledged that Communism has developed into a term often automatically used to describe many closed undemocratic societies. North Korea provides such an example.

Bruce Cumings' Korea's Place in the Sun", did when it was published in 1997 awaken a profound interest for Korea among the general public. A chapter in the book dedicated to the North-Korean history after the Korean War opens with a quote from Confucius: "What all men speak well of, look critically into; what all men condemn, examine first before you decide" (Cumings, 1997, p. 394). Today it seems that even China is going as far it can towards criticising the policies of its eastern neighbour and Communist compatriot, this in spite the country's official policy of non-interference. It is unclear how many North-Koreans have starved to death during the last couple of years, but estimates run from a couple of hundred thousand to more than a million. While the army, which with a standing capacity of more than a million men remains one of the world's biggest, is relatively well fed, children and other weak groups are the ones that suffer. One of the initial explanations offered by Adam Zwass' From Failed Communism to Underdeveloped Capitalism for the demise of The Soviet Union is how the empire was unable to keep pace economically with the industrial states of the West (Zwass, 1995, p. 3). Still did the economic problems never reach the point where the state was not able to feed its own population, and neither is North Korea in any way burdened by having to subsidy various political allies in other parts of the world. Examining the political government of North Korea though, raises serious doubts if Communism can be said to have any influence at all as a political theory. Indeed, if it is correct to categories the form of government as Communist, then one might reach the conclusion that North-Koreans came up with the idea many years before Karl Marx.

On the surface though, the familiar signs of Communism are highly visible. The unique symbol of the Korean Workers Party places a writing brush across the hammer and sickle, indicating an inclusive policy toward the educated and the expert. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed on September 9, 1948, its name in the same way as the former Democratic Republic of Germany implying a conviction of being democratic in the real sense of the word. The initial goal of the Korean revolution was to pursue an inclusive, all-encompassing mass politics, and the three classes - peasant, worker, landlords - were to become unionised into one mass. At the same time were several characteristics of Soviet-style socialism implemented, among these an economic program of rapid industrialisation and a philosophy of subjecting nature to human will. No Communist regime has until now not been able to implement the Communist ideal of collective leadership, and the result has usually been an ultimate reliance on dictators. The last mentioned trap should prove to be fateful for North Korea, this because Kim Il Sung should prove unable to give up power after first having achieved his initial goals.

The best known example of a Communist autarchy can probably be drawn from the era of Stalin, when an autarkic economic system was combined with the features of an autarchic system of government. North Korea would combine these characteristics with Lenin's program of national liberation, this as the Korean peninsula for more than half a century had been governed by the much hated Japanese imperialists. The particularity of the autarchic system was its obvious links and similarities to government systems in Korea's past, which in contrast to Japan's was dominated by powerful kings controlling the as vassal rulers for the Chinese emperor. Before the Japanese occupation of the peninsula, Korea was governed by a reclusive form of government historians have later named the Hermit Kingdom. Bruce Cumings, probably America's most renowned scholar on Korean history, asserts that "Autarky fit Korea's Hermit Kingdom past and answered the need for closure from the world economy after decades of opening under Japanese imperial auspices". Kim Il Sung was after his death in 1994 followed by his son Kim Jong Il, thereby establishing what might be described as a hereditary dictatorship, or more accurately speaking an old-fashioned monarchy.

The Korean War (1950-53) certainly also played a central role in the shaping of North Korea's awkward form of Communism, and without the division of Korea it is less likely we would have seen the extreme North Korean closure witnessed today. Today the war is considered to have been the first main test of strength in the Cold War. The Soviet Union decided not to take part in the fighting, while the Chinese were willing to assist the North Koreans, but this only down to the middle of the peninsula. Mao did during the Chinese civil war receive substantial support from North Korean Communist guerrillas, and did therefore consider China obliged in entering to war to protect North Korea's borders. It has later been discovered that the Americans seriously considered the use of the atomic bomb during especially difficult phases of the war, which made the crisis as serious as that of the Cuban missile crisis. Officially the war never really ended, and 37 000 American soldiers are still stationed in South Korea to scare of any possible violations of the world's heaviest defended border (Economist, "Gunboat Diplomacy"). This year alone there have been several serious border clashes and sea battles, and the suspicion and distrust so well known exist in the same manner as it did during the cold war. The situation has sometimes been compared to that of the formerly divided Germany, but differs on important aspects as for instance the fact that the two German states never were or wanted to be at war with each other. It should now be clear that the historic background of the two Koreas is very different from that of Germany, and that the only significant similarity was the existence of a border splitting a nation into two. Towards the end of this paper, the possibilities of a reunification between the two Koreas will be discussed. Such a solution would certainly put an end to Communism, and is therefore highly relevant in this context. First the background of the worlds most populous country will have to be assessed, this to try answering why Communism is enjoying such longevity in a cultured society as China.

Back when Communism reached its influential peak, regimes inspired by the nineteenth-century creed of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels dominated vast territories and about one-third of the world's population. Within this group, China and the Soviet Union represented two different brands of Communism. The understanding of the origins of Communism in China has usually been based on studies that can be divided into two categories. One emphasises the unfolding of Communism in the 1920's and the Soviet involvement in China. In contrast to this does the second group focus more on the indigenous roots of Chinese Communism, and draws a picture of a movement under Mao Zedong's leadership which was categorised by an anti-imperialistic nationalism. Still there is agreement on that the 1917 October Revolution in Russia provided Chinese radicals with a new strategy of revolution, but later studies have indicated support for the claim that the Chinese later would develop their own form of Communism. Theoretical quarrels were also a main characteristic of the Sino-Russian relationship, and accusations would be flung from both sides when signs of withering from the political and economic ideals of Marxism could be seen. A difference in policy of the above character has often been used to explain why China today remains united and Communist, while the Soviet Union is split up and most of its former republics have either become or are in the process of becoming stable democratic societies.

The Chinese government is currently implementing radical reforms transforming the country's economic system. In many ways the can be seen to be following up the goals of the father of perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev, but they have no intention of abandoning Marxism as a state ideology or the omnipotence of the Communist Party. Thus they are implementing the ideals of perestroika without the political reforms of glasnost, perhaps fearing the latter would bring with it the tragic fate experienced by Gorbachev. The last Soviet president believed that his perestroika would be able to preserve the empire as a confederation of autonomous republics with a pluralistic but socialist democracy for its political system, this in addition to a socialist market economy. As one republic after another declared its independence, Gorbachev ended up as a president without a country and was relieved of his office. The prospect of anything similar makes Beijing officials wary of political reform, this as independence movements in Tibet and many Muslim dominated areas of China are gaining momentum. As the Portuguese later this year will hand Macao back to China, a reunification with Taiwan is the only main obstacle remaining before the ancient goal of a united China is reached. Currently being so close to achieving it, hoping for the right of self-determination for Tibet and other Chinese provinces seems overly optimistic.

North Korea has only on a very limited scale made attempts to reform its economic system. Visas are only rarely handed out to foreigners, this in contrast to China which the last couple of years even have opened up for independent travellers. The fact that foreign news reporters are not allowed to move around freely inside North Korea, and that they in other ways are hindered in giving objective reports on the domestic situation makes it possible to estimate the strength of the Communist leadership. One is actually also uncertain concerning who is actually in charge, this even though initial reports claiming Kim Jong Il to be nothing but a mere puppet have been contradicted. Still there are not any top political figures of the Western world that have had the honour of meeting the North Korean leader, who officially only took power a few months ago, this after having mourned his father for several years. China is as mentioned much more open, and foreign reporters can immediately report home of anything happening in for example the Chinese capital. This is another tremendous change from the days of the cold war, when access to China was very limited. It can be discussed if freedom of press can not possibly coexist with the presence a Communist political system, but the existence of the former has historically meant the absence of the latter. Yet this is not the only aspect that makes an estimation of China's political system difficult.

It is tempting to suggest that China is adopting what can be described post-communism, a system constructed to survive the aftermath of the Cold War. Some scholars will argue that nothing is to be given up in matters of ideology before one has something better to offer. Taiwan became the first democratic society ever a few years ago, but for the above mentioned reasons is their currently little enthusiasm for such a solution on the mainland. One of the main characteristics and fundamental beliefs of communism is the ideal of a classless society, but Deng Xiaoping who initiated the process of economic reform seems rather to have adopted a policy to minimise the contrast between rich and poor. In contrast to North Korea which has met the new times with an increased emphasis on isolation and extreme government goal, the Chinese are practising a much more pragmatic form of communism. To understand the concluding remarks on the future prospects of communism in the two countries, these above factors have to be taken into consideration.

After the election of Kim Dae Jung, a man who himself was imprisoned by the former military regime due to procommunist allegations, South Korea has adopted what has become known as the sunshine policy towards the North. Seemingly anxious to normalise relations, everything from fertilisers to tourists are sent up north to appease the wary isolationists in Pyongyang. This still does not mean that the two are anywhere close to discussing a possible reunification, the distrust and political differences between the Communist North and democratic South are too severe for that to happen. This year has additionally seen more border clashes at a scale that has not been witnessed in years, and an estimated number of 30 northerners were killed in a major sea battle in the beginning of this year. Yet as the severity of the crisis in the poverty-stricken North is becoming clearer to the general public, fractions opposing an immediate reunification have gained momentum. The economic challenge facing West Germany at the point of unification must be considered insignificant compared to a prospective reunification of the Koreas. North Korea is not in any way near the economic level enjoyed by the former East Germany, and the South's economy does in addition have a much smaller capability of absorbing its small brother up North. Before this situation in the North stabilises, there is reason to believe politicians in Seoul are more than satisfied with the current situation. Consequently one should not count on North Koreans to abandon Communism anytime soon. The country's demise has also been proclaimed by foreign speculators at an increasing rate ever since the break-up of the Soviet Union, and even more lately due to the precarious domestic problems. Yet, a big strength is the support North Korea receives from its Western neighbour, and as long as China retains Marxism as state ideology.

In contrast to the static North Korea, China is changing at a tremendous rate. Economically, and to a certain degree also politically speaking, the Chinese system does not resemble anything from ten years ago. To foresee the future of a country moving at this is better left undone, this as it will not come to anything but mere speculation. This is illustrated by the fact that of the many scholars that pinpointed and criticised the flaws of the Soviet System during the Cold War, only one predicted the empire's fall. Believing that a war with a fellow Communist nation would lead to the fall though, did not make it a much better speculation that the ones of scholars foreseeing the survival of the Soviet Union into the next millennium.

Vaclav Havel, the last president of Czechoslovakia, once said that: "One hundred and fifty years ago we had a spectre of communism, today we have a spectre of post-communism" (Zwass 29). One might add that the spectre certainly is smaller than it used to be, and also that it has become more varied and pragmatic. Yet one might also claim that the Cold War was claimed dead a bit too early, as its remnants remain scattered all over the world, though they do not seem as threatening anymore.

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